Abstract
Introduction
Collecting information has always been both a necessity and a challenge for the United Nations. The timely and accurate knowledge of relevant facts is undoubtedly a prerequisite to exercise its functions. However, given the lack of autonomous sources of information, the UN is more often than not reliant upon States to acquire information before they take any action. Recent practice in this respect is marked by informality and opaqueness. These traits are brought into sharp focus particularly in the context of investigations led by United Nations. Once the United Nations is mandated to investigate a given event or situation, the first and necessary step is indeed to collaborate with those who have the relevant information, which is generally States.
Frequently, the United Nations actually requests information from the administrations of States. However, as these exchanges of information have generally taken the form of informal channels, the procedure is rarely transparent. In isolated cases, the collaborating State makes its collaboration public, but these are the exception rather than the rule. This occurred, for example, when Switzerland did so in the context of inquiries on the Oil-for-Food Programme. In order to investigate allegations of fraud and corruption on the part of United Nations officials, personnel, and agents, as well as contractors in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed, in April 2004, an Independent Inquiry Committee (hereinafter the Volcker Commission) specially devoted to this matter. 1 Following this, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1538 (2004) , which endorsed the inquiry and called for full cooperation in the investigation by all United Nations officials and personnel, the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, and all other Member States, including their national regulatory authorities. Immediately as its mission began, the Volcker Commission requested assistance from a number of States, among them Switzerland and its State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), and the Swiss Federal Council authorised SECO to cooperate with the Volcker Commission on 22 December 2004. 2 Subsequently, approximately 170 federal files including numerous banking documents were communicated by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (CFB) to the Volcker Commission, and interviews with 30 different representatives of banks and merchants in oil and other enterprises took place in Switzerland under the supervision of SECO. This case raises many questions. What is the legal basis for this cooperation? Is there an obligation for the State to furnish the requested documents? What are the consequences of a State refusing such a request? Under what conditions does the exchange of information have to be made? What happens when the United Nations itself is requested to give information they obtained from one State to another State? It is noteworthy that in the same context of the investigations on the Oil-for-Food Programme, at least six Congressional panels, the Treasury Department, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and the Manhattan District Attorney, were also investigating allegations of corruption and mismanagement. 4 During a meeting organized in Washington on 13 July 2004, officials and diplomats representing the United States stated that Paul A. Volcker had rejected requests from members of Congress for access to review documents and to interview United Nations officials being scrutinized by the Volker Commission. 5 Although this practice of cooperation is a recurring reality for the United Nations, and can be a crucial means to fulfil its functions, its legal framework remains unclear and controversial. The exchange of information in this way relies more on political arrangements between the United Nations and the States concerned than on legal obligation. For practical reasons, the determination of applicable rules may not be a priority for the United Nations and States, as long as no particular problems arise, and as long as exchanges of information can take place through informal and political processes. However, it is likewise true that the lack of a clear legal framework could hamper the requesting authority in fulfilling its objectives when the institution giving the information is reluctant to furnish confidential or sensitive documents in the absence of legal guarantees.
Regardless, acting outside of any formal legal framework does not bode well for the United Nations as it strives for transparency and legitimacy. 6 One can argue that the type of relationship described above necessarily implies a degree of flexibility, and thus of informality. What this article will attempt to show is that flexibility, or at least good-functioning, does not necessarily imply informality. Taking similar examples of exchanges of information at the international, European, and domestic levels, it will be argued that a formal legal basis stressing a limited number of conditions for the exchange of information has already been established and thus may be possible in the context of the United Nations.
The structure of this article is as follows. First, it will define in more detail the collaboration between the United Nations and States (Section 2). Secondly, the question of the legal basis of the exchange of information between the United Nations and States will be addressed (3). Next, the exchange of information at the international level also takes place between entities other than international organizations and States. The study of these relationships may indicate possible ways to strengthen the legal framework for the aforementioned exchanges (4). Furthermore, the European (5), and the domestic levels (6), may also provide enlightening insights into the matter. Lastly, we will suggest some conditions gathered that, in the author's view, should be applied to the exchange of information between international organizations and States (7).
terminological Remarks
The collaboration between States and the United Nations can take many forms. The particular form that will be studied in this paper is the exchange of information. The latter occurs when one of the United Nations bodies requests information from a State in order to fulfil one of the objectives of the requesting authority. The term information is broadly understood here. It can cover, for example, the exchange of banking or fiscal documents, access to databases, or interviewing witnesses. As already mentioned, United Nations activities that give rise to this type of collaboration usually occurs during the course of investigations.
The notion of an 'investigation' has been defined as covering "any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security". 7 The sole provision of the UN Charter that assigns investigatory powers to a United Nations organ is Article 34. This empowers the Security Council to investigate "any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". However, the Security Council is not the only organ of the United Nations that is authorized to make investigations. According to the implied powers theory, other UN organs, such as the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, can conduct investigations. 8 Similarly, the Security Council is empowered to acquire information by other means of investigations and for purposes other than those mentioned in Article 34. 9 In practice, only two decisions of the Security Council in which it ordered an investigation referring expressly to Article 34 have been taken. 10 More frequently, the Security Council has decided to investigate outside of the framework of Article 34, using its implied powers as a mandate to do so. 11 Recent practice has confirmed the tendency of the Security Council to collect information by more informal means to avoid the restrictive scope of Article 34. Using Article 28 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure, the Security Council has established specific bodies to conduct investigations. 12 These bodies have had different names over time, such as "sub-committee", 13 "special mission", 14 or "commission of investigation". 15 In these cases, it was foreseen that the investigatory organs should benefit from the full cooperation of States. In the Corfu Channel case, for example, the Security Council "empowered the sub-committee to request further information as it deem[ed] necessary from the parties to the dispute, and the representatives of the United Kingdom and Albania [were] requested to give every assistance to the sub-committee in its work". 16 In situations requiring urgent action, the Security Council has also requested the Secretary General to appoint a mission of investigation in accordance with the powers of that office. 17 This shows a clear tendency on the part of the Security Council to delegate its investigative powers. 18 These practices have prompted the need to redefine the notion of investigation in the context of the United Nations. Regarding the definition adopted in Article 34, the purpose of the investigation -the maintenance of international peace and security -seems to be the primary criterion. This real purpose of Article 34 was presumably one of the reasons that the Security Council has avoided reference to it as a mandate for investigations in recent times. 19 Instead of a strict focus on the originally intended end of the provision, however, it may be more appropriate to shift attention to the means of investigation used by the United Nations (that is, the actual exchange of information). Investigation in the United Nations today implies the use by the Security Council, or another organ of the United Nations, of a fact-finding procedure -through an exchange of information -mandated by their implied powers of investigation. Consequently, it is this aspect of procedure that will form the centrepiece of the present study.
Legal Basis for the exchange of Information between the Un and states
Even if the implied powers theory can justify the right of UN organs to investigate, it nevertheless leaves another important question unanswered: do States have an obligation to respond positively to the request for information? In this section, the potential legal sources of this obligation will be studied methodically, starting with a State's membership in the United Nations (Section 3.1), followed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter (3.2), and then other relevant dispositions of the UN Charter, such as Article 25 (3.3), will be considered. Lastly, this study will analyze the questions raised 16) Supra note 13. by the delegation of investigation powers from the Security Council to the Secretary-General (3.4).
An Obligation to Cooperate Stemming From Membership?
The first argument for the existence of an obligation to cooperate on the international plane may originate simply by virtue of being a member of an organization. In this respect, both the State and the organization will inherently have an obligation to cooperate with one another given that each has freely entered into a reciprocal relationship of sorts. This argument was explicitly used by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt. According to the Court, "the very fact of Egypt's membership of the Organization entails certain mutual obligations of cooperation and good faith incumbent upon Egypt and upon the Organization". 20 The Court clearly states here that a duty to cooperate applies not only between the international organization and the host State, but also in respect of all Member States. 21 An obligation to cooperate may be strengthened by the existence of good faith in a given relationship. Good faith can operate not only to ensure that the activities of international organizations are conducted effectively, but it can also help to prompt cooperation by ensuring that all means available to cooperate are used. 22 the ability to do so, is not acting in good faith. This link between the obligation to cooperate and an obligation of good faith was also highlighted by the Commission on Darfur when it considered that "both the Government of Sudan and the rebels (were) under a bona fide obligation to cooperate with it in the discharge of its various functions". 23 Is this sufficient to conclude with certainty that such an obligation exists? At this juncture, it is necessary to distinguish the two sides of the aforementioned obligation, which are an obligation to cooperate and an obligation to do so in good faith. These obligations are manifestly interdependent. However, the existence of an independent obligation to act in good faith in this context is open to doubt. Indeed, there is probably only an obligation to abide by already existing substantial rules in good faith. 24 This interpretation has been adopted by the Court itself eight years after the WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion. 25 The weakness of any obligation to act in good faith may be thus derived from the uncertainties concerning the normative status of the obligation to cooperate. This is fundamentally problematic for the abovementioned argument.
All considered, the existence of an obligation to cooperate which stems from membership in an international organization is doubtful, or at least, controversial. In any case, if we admit that a customary rule is emerging, its operational features remain unclear and many questions are left unanswered. What is the concrete meaning of this obligation? Does the obligation apply to ultra vires activities of international organizations? Furthermore, the existence of such an obligation must be analyzed by taking into account the specific character of membership. While sovereign States submit themselves voluntarily to international organizations by becoming members, they nevertheless retain control over both themselves and their institutions. Where the UN faces a situation in which a State refuses to cooperate, it may have to resort to a more coercive measure to extract information. One option is for it to premise its request on a less controversial and more solid foundation, such as its mandatory Chapter VII powers.
An Obligation to Cooperate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter?
Regarding fact-finding committees, cooperation has been premised on Chapter VII in two occasions: when States were requested to cooperate with the Commission on Darfur, and also when the commission was established to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The legal basis for the Commission on Darfur was Article 41 of the UN Charter, used here for the first time to authorize the creation of a fact-finding committee. 27 In its Report, released on 25 January 2005, the Commission noted that both the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups had willingly accepted to cooperate with the Commission, notably by providing it with free access to all sources of information, including documentary material and physical evidence. 28 Originally, the Commission on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was not based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 29 (2004) . The SC, "Determining that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region, Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter", (para. 12) "Requests that the Secretary-General rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, calls on all parties to cooperate fully with such a commission, and further requests the Secretary-General, in conjunction with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to take appropriate steps to increase the number of human rights monitors deployed to Darfur". 28) Supra note 23. defined the modalities of the cooperation, was signed by the Commission and the Lebanese Government respectively. 30 In this agreement it was decided that the Lebanese Government, shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to fulfil its mandate, including … [p]rovision of all documentary, testimonial and physical information and evidence in possession of the Lebanese authorities on the case as soon as possible, but no later than three days after the signature of this MOU. Any additional documentary, testimonial or physical information and evidence that may be collected by the Lebanese authorities after the signature of this MOU, shall also be provided to the Commission as soon as possible, but no later than three days from the date they were collected. 31 In the first report released on 20 October 2005, the Commission emphasised the lack of cooperation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which had impeded the investigation. 32 Following this report, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1636, which was based on its Chapter VII powers, resolving that all States shall cooperate with the Commission. 33 information and evidence, both documentary and physical, pertaining to this terrorist act, as well as to interview all officials and other persons in Lebanon, that the Commission deems relevant to the inquiry". However, in the meantime, the SC at para. 7 "Calls on all States and all parties to cooperate fully with the Commission, and in particular to provide it with any relevant information they may possess pertaining to the above-mentioned terrorist act". 30) See <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2005393.pdf>. 31) Ibid. This Resolution was especially adopted to enhance the collaboration of Syria with the inquiry, which was accused of not cooperating or even trying to undermine the work of the Commission. It was noted in the second report, released after Resolution 1636, that the Commission's efforts to gain the cooperation of the Syrian authorities "have recently begun to bear fruit after delays which had an impact on the Commission's ability to effectively carry out its work". 34 In short, it seems that the use of Chapter VII powers by the Security Council is a means to induce the cooperation of States. As the General Assembly Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security provides: "States should cooperate with United Nations fact-finding missions and give them, within the limits of their capabilities, the full and prompt assistance necessary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their mandate". 35 It must be noted here that the use of Chapter VII of the Charter should not be interpreted as requiring States to cooperate, but only as a way of enhancing their cooperation. In the end, the final decision to cooperate or not will be made by States. In the absence of their cooperation, committees will not risk a direct confrontation with the uncooperative State. They will simply refer the matter to the Security Council when a State does not agree to furnish documents. Where the State still fails to take heed, their refusal to act in accordance with its obligations will be noted. 36 Finally, it appears that Chapter VII, albeit useful to induce States to cooperate, cannot be the panacea in every case. It can serve as a legal basis, but only in certain limited cases. In this way, investigations are often required for situations other than those that qualify as a threat to the peace, breaches (1996) , S/RES/1053, the Security Council (para. 8) "expresses concern at the lack of response by certain States to the Commission's inquiries, and calls upon those States that have not yet done so to cooperate fully with the Commission in its inquiries and to investigate fully reports of their officials and nationals suspected of violating the relevant Council resolutions". of the peace, or as an act of aggression, which is the criterion for decisions taken under Chapter VII. This would be the case, for example, in respect of investigations concerning frauds committed by United Nations or State agents.
An Obligation to Cooperate under Other Provisions of the UN Charter?
Other provisions of the UN Charter may be a source of an obligation for States to assist international organizations in their investigations. A cursory examination of Article 2(5) suggests that this provision contains a general obligation for Member States to give assistance to the organization. 37 However, as the obligation under this provision applies to "actions" and the last part of the sentence in the provision refers to "enforcement action", it is clear that "only enforcement measures taken by the Security Council according to Chapter VII can be envisaged". 38 Another argument may be that States have an obligation to assist the United Nations each time the Security Council makes a request to that effect, by virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter. 39 According to this reasoning, Article 25 could be a means to oblige States to give assistance when the Security Council so decides, even if its decision in this respect is not based on Chapter VII. This obligation to "accept and carry out" the decision to investigate could also be interpreted as giving a binding effect to the request based on Article 34 of the UN Charter. 40 According to the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, before determining if a resolution of the Security Council has binding force, "the language used by the Security Council should be carefully analysed". 41 The importance of 37) Article 2(5) of the UN Charter: "All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action". the language used by the Security Council may be seen, for example, when it 'decides' to request the implementation of economic sanctions, rather than simply to emphasise the political will of the Council. This tends to occur where it is attempting to strengthen the legal obligation at stake. 42 In contrast, the Security Council may hesitate to phrase an obligation in terms of a 'decision', when it feels that this obligation will not be implemented immediately or when it believes it is more important to highlight its political will rather than the legal obligation to the addressee of the resolution. 43 In practice, it appears that the Security Council tends rather to 'call upon' States to cooperate fully than to 'decide' that States must cooperate.
Chapter VII and Article 25 of the UN Charter can sometimes provide a legal basis at the international level, but not one that is permanent and that will work in every case. An obligation probably to cooperate when the Security Council decides that a State has to cooperate, or when its request is based on Chapter VII. However, this becomes problematic in the case of investigations led by other organs of the United Nations. These investigations have become more relevant given the recent tendency of the Security Council to delegate investigation powers to the Secretary-General. The terms of reference of the Commission were annexed to the letter. Its Article 2 states that "the Commission shall enjoy the full cooperation of the Government of Pakistan", whereas Article 3 foresees requests for cooperation by third States. 48 The terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry for Guinea contain mutatis mutandis similar provisions, respectively in Articles 3 and 4. 49 The 'softness' of these recent practices may be explained by the fact that the establishment of each commission was expressly requested by the State concerned. The government of Guinea has, moreover, indicated in writing its willingness to cooperate with and facilitate the work of the Commission. 50 The Commission on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto has recently encountered the limits of its cooperation with Pakistani authorities as its written request to interrogate military officials, including the Chief of Army Staff Ashaq Parvez Kayani, former ISI Chief Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj and former Military Intelligence Chief Lt. Gen. Naddem Ejaz Mian, was rejected by the Government of Pakistan. 51 Following the extension of its mandate by three more months, the Commission released its report on 15 April 2010. 52 This report revealed not only a lack of cooperation but also "efforts of certain high-ranking government officials to obstruct access to Pakistani military and intelligence sources". 53 The all of the Commission's meetings with the authorities proceeded smoothly and with full cooperation of the authorities, except for a number of requests that were denied or ignored. Lieutenant Toumba, for example, denied the Commission's request to meet with individuals under his command who had been identified as such or who were alleged to have actively participated in the events of 28 September at the Stadium. The Minister of Defence did not reply to the Commission's request to visit the Kundara and Kassa camps and, despite several oral requests to the Director-General of the National Police, a copy of the report prepared by the technical and scientific police experts present at the stadium and at the Bellevue police station was never provided. 55 The United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry was established to investigate a number of incidents which occurred during the course of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel in which United Nations personnel, premises and operations were affected. Its context and purpose are clearly different from the two other examples already mentioned. Regarding the Pakistan and Guinea requests, the inquiry committees were acting, following what was in effect a, 'delegation of competence' given by the requesting State. Committees give technical support but also, above all, provide a guarantee of independence and legitimacy to the inquiry. This is significant given that the investigations concern events in which current or former governmental authorities were or were supposed to be involved.
Questions Raised by the Appointment of Inquiry Committees by the Secretary-General in the Absence of Further Endorsement by the Security Council
It must be noted that the report made public by the Board was not the full report but rather a summary. It is noteworthy that a high level of confidentiality has been adopted during this inquiry. Indeed, the SecretaryGeneral noted that "the Board's report is an internal document and is not for public release. It contains significant amounts of information that was shared with the Board in strict confidence. It also contains a significant body of information, the disclosure of which could prejudice the security or proper conduct of the Organization's operations or activities". 56 explain why no explicit reference was made in the summary of any lack of cooperation by Israel. Latter parts of this study will be devoted to the potential of strengthening confidentiality in all exchanges of information. 57 However, we must remain aware of the fact that given the internal nature of the inquiry, to make public a lack of cooperation on the part of Israel would have been of limited utility.
Overall, it appears that the exchange of information between the United Nations and States can function without any problems. However, the proper functioning of those exchanges relies more on diplomatic arrangements than on legal guarantees. The consequences of a refusal to cooperate with a Committee are thus outside of its realm of control. If an obligation to cooperate could be identified in some cases, (that is within the framework of Chapter VII powers), uncertainties still remain about the enforcement of this obligation. Is it really plausible, for example, that a State's refusal to respond to a request for information be qualified as a threat to the peace? 58 It seems necessary to formalize these relationships. It should be taken into account, of course, that these exchanges are of a specific nature and inevitably encroach upon a State's sovereignty. The establishment of an obligation in this domain could therefore be challenging. Nevertheless, the study of other types of exchanges of information at the international level may be useful to identify possible means and the methodology to meet this challenge.
Lessons that Can be Learned from Other Information sharing Channels at the International Level
There are other mechanisms which allow for the exchange of information at the international level. The study of these mechanisms may help in identifying how the relationships between the UN and States can be formalized. The present study will now turn to examine both the exchange of information in the context of criminal procedures (Section 4.1), and also between international organizations (4.2).
57) See infra Section 7. 65 Under Articles 86 to 102 of the Statute of Rome establishing the International Criminal Court, States Parties have an obligation to furnish assistance to the Court as well. However, the regime of those obligations will not be the same, since the obligation to cooperate with ICTY and ICTR is provided by Security Council resolutions, whereas the obligation to cooperate with the ICC is treaty-based. Only States that are parties to the Statute will in principle be under an international obligation to cooperate with the Court, 66 whereas with the ad hoc Tribunals established on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, all Member States of the UN are under an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals. 67 We can also note that both the ICTY 68 and ICC 69 can collaborate with States when they are leading investigations or trials for crimes which fall their respective jurisdictions. Agreements allowing for the exchange of information in criminal matters were also concluded between the ICC and the United Nations, 70 the European Union, 71 Interpol, 72 and the AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Organization. 73 
Exchange of Information in the Context of Criminal Procedures

Exchange of Information between International Organizations
Mechanisms allowing for the exchange of information have also been established between international organizations. Regarding the United Nations system, cooperation agreements were first concluded with regional organizations. Examples include the agreements made between the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 74 the Organization of African Unity, 75 and between UNESCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 76 Agreements of cooperation were also concluded between 76) See the full text of the agreement, especially Article IV, which provides "ASEAN and UNESCO shall arrange to the fullest extent possible and so far as is practicable for the exchange of information and documents on matters of common interest. This will include, where appropriate, the exchange of information and documents relating to specific projects, programmes or activities with a view to better complementary action and more effective co-ordination between the two organizations", <www.aseansec.org/7922.htm>.
the United Nations and specialized agencies, such as the World Tourism Organization, 77 and the World Intellectual Property Organization. 78 Another significant example of these specific types of cooperation between international organizations are the agreements concluded with the International Criminal Police Organization (hereinafter Interpol). 79 A great number of agreements on cooperation have been concluded between Interpol and other international organizations, such as the United Nations, 80 the International Atomic Energy Agency, 81 and the International Maritime Organization. 82 As this brief exploration demonstrates, cooperation in the context of criminal procedures and cooperation between international organizations is rooted in agreements in an international context and on the basis of need. The cooperation is thus premised on a 'consensual' source and not on an 80) Assistance is foreseen at Article 3 of the Agreement, which states that "[t]he United Nations and Interpol shall make every effort to achieve the best use of available information related to the issues of common interest. To that end, and subject to necessary limitations and their internal regulations concerning the safeguarding of confidential or semi-confidential material and information, they shall arrange for the exchange of information and documents of common interest": <www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/ UN1997.asp>. 81) Assistance is foreseen at Article 2, which provides "(1) The Parties shall exchange information on developments in their activities, which are the subject of this co-operation agreement, and projects that are of mutual interest with a view to promoting co-ordination and co-operation": <www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/ InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency200604.asp>. authoritative one, in contrast to that imposed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 83 An obligation to cooperate under sensitive circumstances is more likely to succeed if based on consensus. Furthermore, it must be noted that almost all of these treaties have a bilateral character. Indeed, it is self-evident that a consensus may be more easily reached between two actors than in the context of multilateral negotiations. As a result, it seems that if an obligation to cooperate between the UN and States must be achieved, it should take the form of consensual and bilateral instruments.
This proposition may be a cause for concern where the conclusion of a significant number of agreements is required. However, information-sharing channels at the international level show that the diversity of such agreements do not necessarily require a complex legal regime. Although the wording in these agreements occasionally changes, the conditions underpinning the exchange of information remain more or less the same from one agreement to another.
exchange of Information at the european Level
The European Union provides numerous examples of mechanisms assisting the exchange of information between Member States and European institutions. Most of these exchanges take place between Member States and the European Commission. These forms of assistance stem from the various activities of the Commission, particularly those that endeavour to protect the European Union's financial interests. For example, according to Regulation 2185/96, the Commission has the competence to carry out on-the-spot checks and inspections within Member States in order to protect the Communities against fraud and other irregularities. 84 On the other hand, requests for information emanating from Member States in respect of the Commission can be made. In that case, assistance may take the form of access to reports drawn up by the Commission officials, such as inspectors' reports. 85 Such 'vertical' assistance may also be provided by European entities other than the Commission. 86 The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), established in 1999, is responsible for ensuring the collection and analysis of information in relation to the fight against fraud. 87 Member States are under a "duty to inform the Office", 88 and the Office may at any time forward to the competent authorities of the Member States concerned information obtained in the course of its investigations. 89 Requests for information may also be made to Member States by the European Police Office (Europol), which is responsible for facilitating the exchange of information between Member States, as well as obtaining, collating, and analysing information and intelligence on crimes that fall under its competence. 90 The establishment of 2) The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and, in so far as national law allows, the Member States shall, at the request of the Office or on their own initiative, forward any document or information they hold which relates to a current internal investigation. Member States shall forward the documents and information relating to external investigations in accordance with the relevant provisions. (3) The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and, in so far as national law allows, the Member States shall also send the Office any other document or information considered pertinent which they hold relating to the fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the Communities' financial interests", <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_136/l_13619990531en00010007.pdf>. a legal framework for this type of cooperation began taking place in 1992 upon the inception of the Maastricht Treaty, and has been progressively strengthened. Mechanisms for the exchange of information can be found in three different domains, namely immigration policies, customs cooperation and the fight against fraud.
Regarding visas, asylum, or immigration, Article 66 of the Amsterdam Treaty provided that "the European Council shall take measures to ensure cooperation between the relevant departments of the administrations of the Member States … as well as between those departments and the Commission". 91 This treaty has provided a basis for decisions of the European Council, like the decision of 13 June 2002 that adopted an action programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum, and immigration (ARGO programme). 92 The scope of this legal basis has been extended in the Lisbon Treaty under Article 74. 93 This article is found under the General Provisions of Title V on the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, which includes not only immigration policies, but also judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters as well as police cooperation.
Article 135 of the Amsterdam Treaty also provided a legal basis for decisions in respect of customs cooperation. 94 This Article has been reproduced in extenso in Article III-152 of the Constitution for Europe, and in Article 33 of the Lisbon Treaty. Such vertical cooperation was established through mechanisms of assistance between the administrative authorities of the 91) See <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997E/htm/11997E.html#0173010078>. Union: "The Council shall adopt measures to ensure administrative cooperation between the relevant departments of the Member States in the areas covered by this Title, as well as between those departments and the Commission. It shall act on a Commission proposal, subject to article 76, and after consulting the European Parliament". 94) Article 135 of the EC Treaty: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty, the Council … shall take measures in order to strengthen customs cooperation between Member States and between the latter and the Commission. These measures shall not concern the application of national criminal law or the national administration of justice", <www.eur-lex.europa.eu/ en/treaties/dat/11997E/htm/11997E.html#0173010078>.
Member States and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters. 95 Regarding the fight against fraud, the exchange of information between Member States and the Commission may be based on Article 280(3) of the Amsterdam Treaty, which is reproduced mutatis mutandis at Article 325(3) of the Lisbon Treaty. 96 This legal basis was notably used for the adoption of the 'Hercule' Programmes I (2004) (2005) (2006) 97 and II (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , 98 which promoted activities in the field of the protection of the Community's financial interests by "enhancing transnational and multidisciplinary cooperation between member States' authorities, the Commission and OLAF". 99 It is pertinent to note that whereas the aforementioned instruments were concluded in specific areas, a provision in the Lisbon Treaty envisages cooperation within the Union as a mechanism potentially applicable to all cases regarding the implementation of Union law. 
International Law and Domestic Analogies: The Concept of Administrative Assistance
The concept of administrative assistance is conceptually rooted at the domestic level. It is (classically) defined as "assistance given on the request of an authority or another government agency to the requesting authority … in order to enable or to facilitate the execution of (its) functions". 101 In short, it refers to cooperation between domestic administrative authorities. Originally, mutual assistance mechanisms were developed between authorities within the same State. Obligations to give assistance could often be found at the constitutional level, especially in federal States. Article 35 of the Fundamental Law of Germany provides, for example, that "all federal and Land authorities shall render legal and administrative assistance to one another". 102 If there is no provision in the State's constitution, assistance is rendered on the basis of laws or agreements. 103 Assistance mechanisms at the international level were, and continue to be, established between State authorities through specific treaties. These treaties can address the issue of assistance in general, both administrative and criminal, such as in the treaty signed on 31 May 1988 between the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. 104 Additionally they can focus on one specific matter, like the treaty on administrative assistance in customs matters signed on 21 March 1975 between France and Senegal. 105 The legal framework of inter-State assistance rests on a vast web of specific bilateral agreements.
There is no general treaty that provides requirements which can be applied to all forms of assistance, and on any matter. Treaties remain a traditional mechanism for formally establishing assistance between two States.
It may be possible to "transplant" domestic concepts, 106 such as assistance in administrative matters, to the international level. In one case concerning Switzerland, a mechanism to exchange information with international organizations inspired by the existing inter-State mechanisms has been adopted. 107 This is the Federal Law on the Application of International Sanctions or loi sur les embargos (LEmb), which provides in Article 7 that competent federal authorities may cooperate and coordinate their inquiries with international organisations. 108 This law is not limited to collaboration with a sanction committee. It was also used by the Swiss Federal Council as the legal basis for the cooperation with the Volcker Commission. 109 The advantage of this legal basis is that cooperation between Switzerland and an international organization can be based on this law or on a resolution adopted by an international organization. However, the determination of a legal basis for the cooperation at the domestic level obviously has the disadvantage of being limited to a single State. Even if a majority of States have a domestic legal basis for cooperation, it is likely that the conditions will differ from State to State. While a mass harmonisation exercise would be inherently problematic, it would possible, and perhaps more fruitful, to focus on extracting a number of basic principles from existing practice within States.
A Proposal for a Basic set of Conditions for the exchange of Information between the Un and states
The objective of this section is to describe the optimal conditions for the exchange of information that could be applied in the relationship between the UN and collaborating States. These conditions are derived from conditions that are applied at the domestic, the international, and the European levels, and from the practice that already exists between international organizations and States. A leading criterion for the exchange of information, which is required both at the domestic and international level, is confidentiality (Section 7.1). We will examine the question of the potential application of the principles of speciality, proportionality (7.2), and good faith (7.3), in the relationship between States and international organizations. The question of reciprocity is more problematic. It appears that it should not be considered as a condition for the exchange of information (7.4).
Confidentiality
Collaboration with international organizations often concerns the transfer of information that is protected at the domestic level. Therefore the United Nations must provide States with guarantees that this information will not be made public. Consequently, States request confidentiality. For example, the Swiss Federal Law on the application of international sanctions provides that the international organisation is bound by the secret de fonction or by the devoir de discrétion équivalent, and there must be a guarantee that the information will not be used to facilitate economic spying.
Provisions on confidentiality are found in the guidelines of the committees concerned. In the 'Investigations Guidelines' of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (hereinafter IIC), 110 it is stipulated that the Committee may determine that special measures to ensure confidentiality of sources or witnesses are required.
This may include the use of a confidential source registry and designation, limits to the access of information about the identities of certain persons, and the use of normal file protection. If there has been any unauthorized disclosure of information by any IIC staff member, this disclosure "will be reported by the Executive Director to the IIC Chairman so that prompt corrective action can be taken, which may include the removal of the IIC staff member and notification to the affected person(s)". 111 Similar provisions can be found in the guidelines of sanction committees. Taking a recent example, the Guidelines of the Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1737 (Sanction against the Islamic Republic of Iran) 112 provides that "the information received by the Committee will be kept confidential if the provider so requests or if the Committee so decides". 113 Even if these guidelines "do not and are not intended to confer, impose or imply any duties, obligations or rights that are enforceable in any court of law or administrative proceedings", the credibility of the committee will largely depend on how, in practice, it can guarantee confidentiality. 114 Selfimposing a strict obligation of confidentiality may also hamper the activity of such organs. This is especially true for sanction committees which, in the case of drawing up a list of individuals or entities, must deal with different claims that come from States, depending on how they cooperate. On the one hand, States in which the listed individuals and entities (or their assets) are believed to be located may request as much information as possible from the Committee about the individuals and entities listed, whereas on the other hand, it will be a matter of priority for States which have submitted 111) Ibid. the names of the listed individuals/entities to receive assurances from the Committee that the information they have provided is kept confidential. 115 In April 2003, investigative offices of several international organizations agreed on the need to harmonize their practices and endorse a set of uniform guidelines for investigations. 116 These guidelines state that investigators should endeavour to maintain both the confidentiality and, to the extent possible, the protection of witnesses. In short, confidentiality in the case of the exchange of information is guaranteed by a set of guidelines that are not binding on the UN committees. The imposition of an obligation of confidentiality, both on States and on international organizations, through a binding norm, could enhance the cooperation. Such norms could find a model in the provision regarding confidentiality made by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). According to Article 8 of Regulation 1073/1999, the Office and its employees are bound by an obligation of confidentiality but are able to communicate information to persons within the institutions of the European Communities or in the Member States if necessary.
Proportionality and Speciality
The principle of speciality means that the information that will be transferred from States to international organizations, and vice versa, will be used exclusively in order to act in conformity with the object of the request. 117 If the receiving authority wants or needs to use the information for the purpose of investigating or deciding on other infractions or facts, or to communicate such information to other entities, the consent of the sending authority must first be obtained. The application of the principle of speciality to the relationship between States and international organizations could be a guarantee that the information transferred will not be used for other purposes than those mentioned in the said request. According to the principle of proportionality, the requesting authority shall not go beyond, in its request for information, what is strictly necessary to achieve the objects of its mission or mandate. 118 The application of this principle would limit the requesting authority to request only those materials that are necessary in a given case, and prohibit it from pursuing other ends, such as other investigations, about which the sending authority is not informed.
Good Faith
The necessity to cooperate in good faith was outlined by the International Court of Justice and by the Committee on Darfur, as cited above. 119 At the European level, a similar requirement is found in Article 10 of the EC Treaty on the principle of loyal cooperation. However, as the addressees of this obligation are "member States", 120 it was not clear if such an obligation also applied to European institutions as well. The European Court of Justice, in the Zwartveld case, made clear that the relationship between Member States and Community institutions is governed, according to Article 10 of the EC Treaty, by a principle of sincere cooperation. 121 According to the Court, "that principle not only requires the Member States to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law … but also imposes on Member States and the Community institutions mutual duties of sincere cooperation". 122 Following this decision, the Lisbon Treaty 118) This condition is derived from the principle of proportionality that operates in Community Law (Article 5 of the EC Treaty provides that "any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objects of the Treaty" on the European Union has provided, in addition to the aforementioned provisions, that "pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties". 123 Two accepted forms of good faith may be distinguished. On a restrictive reading, good faith is seen as providing a "flexible basis with which to impose some basic obligations that enable the Organization to protect itself from acts that could undermine its functioning". 124 From a broader perspective, the obligation to cooperate in good faith is derived directly from the "fundamental feature which is the accomplishment without any disturbance of certain functions that aims to fulfil a common purpose". 125 Accordingly, good faith operates not only to protect the activities of international organizations, but also to enhance cooperation by ensuring that all available means are resorted to. The principle of good faith consequently entails not only a negative obligation, namely that the sending authority shall refrain from deliberately providing incorrect information which would jeopardize the fulfilment of the mission or mandate of the requesting authority, but also a positive obligation on the part of the sending States to cooperate by all available means with the requesting authority. In the context of the United Nations, the imposition of such an obligation to cooperate in good faith could undoubtedly enhance the cooperation of States and strengthen the investigation capacities of the organization.
The Question of Reciprocity
The question of whether reciprocity can be viewed as a condition of the exchange of information is controversial. The Swiss Federal Law on the application of international sanctions stipulates that competent federal authorities can communicate information to international organizations and waive the condition of reciprocity, which is usually an automatic condition for the provision of documents to a foreign State. However, before the legislation was adopted, the Swiss Federal Tribunal clearly provided that reciprocity is not a condition for the granting of administrative assistance between States. 126 If reciprocity is to be understood as a condition for the exchange of information, it would mean that States could have an automatic right to obtain information from international organizations on the sole condition that States have previously communicated information to them. This automatic right to information would create a conflict of norms with the international organization's duty of confidentiality vis-à-vis the information it has obtained from other States. The viability of this system may be threatened by such a requirement. It is perhaps for this reason that the Swiss Government has decided, in the context of the above-mentioned legislation, to renounce reciprocity in specific cases of cooperation with an international organization.
Conclusion
The analysis of the relationship between domestic administrations and international organizations was an issue that was examined in the early days of the United Nations. In a study plan made by UNESCO on 11 April 1949 and entitled 'Domestic Administrations in their Relations with International Organizations', 127 a proposal was made to study this relationship and to "encourage States to improve their own domestic mechanisms in order to be able to fulfil their obligations as members of international organizations". 128 Recent events have once again brought this question to light. The main priority seems to be to establish clear legal bases for cooperation between States and the UN. The question of the formalization of the exchange of information between the United Nations and States can prompt several institutional responses. Such a legal basis should set out the conditions for its application. This legal basis could take different forms, like a multilateral treaty concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, a model bilateral treaty, or a set of uniform guidelines for international organizations. In the author's view, and according to the practices analyzed before, it seems that the best way to achieve this goal is a model bilateral treaty. Indeed, it seems more adequate to base the exchange of information on a consensual source that could be concluded on the basis of the need. It should be noted that such initiatives have already been taken by some international organizations such as Interpol. A model agreement has been compiled on the basis of numerous studies. 129 Another type of relationship that must be taken into account is the relationship between international organizations on the one hand, and private individuals and entities concerned with the sharing of information on the other. It seems that it is necessary to provide for mechanisms that allow individuals and entities -whose bank details have been transmitted for example -to contest or control the use of this information. In the absence of this kind of procedure, international organizations may be confronted with problematic consequences, as was recently illustrated in the case of listed sanctions of the 1267 Committee and the Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation case before the European Court of Justice. 130 Regarding the possibility for individuals and entities to contest a decision of a State to transmit information about them at the domestic level, two cases that came before the Swiss Federal Tribunal have shown the inherent problems of the absence of a clear legal framework in this area. 131 Two claims contesting the decision of the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs to transmit confidential information to the Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food Programme were rejected by the Federal Tribunal, in which it clearly drew a distinction between treaty-based assistance and assistance accorded without any conventional basis. In the case of assistance based on a treaty, a claim made against the domestic legal basis of application will be admissible. It was made clear in the judgment that all transmission of information to foreign authorities will not be considered as an acte de gouvernement; in the majority of cases of assistance -in criminal or administrative matters -foreign relations are without a doubt involved, but decisions taken on that matter takes place within the framework of pre-established conventional relations, and has not the political character that justifies a subtraction to any judicial review. 132 The assistance given to the Inquiry Committee has been consequently qualified as a political decision, exempt from judicial review. Respecting privacy and the right of individuals to challenge their State's decision to transmit information to another State or to international organizations constitute other fundamental issues that require further and more detailed consideration.
Transparency is also an issue that merits a more thorough examination in the context of the exchange of information between the UN and States. On initial consideration, confidentiality and transparency may appear contradictory. Indeed, if we acknowledge that the information shared must stay confidential, it seems nonsensical to insist that, simultaneously, the UN and the States be completely transparent in their actions. Contrarily, it is submitted that confidentiality and transparency are not contradictory but rather complementary. A balance might be achieved with, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the operation and, on the other, its legitimacy. In order to increase the legitimacy of their activities, international organizations have to establish mechanisms that enhance the transparency of their actions. It has become increasingly necessary to apply this principle in the relations between international organizations and States, but also between international organizations and individuals. 133 The viability and the legitimacy of UN investigations will depend in large part on the efforts to make more transparent these practices that should no longer stay in the shadows. 
